Phone, Suggest a phone number chef d’équipe trinome de combat / armurier section. Work Position. chef d’équipe trinome de combat / armurier section. ses personnels. LE TRINOME La double dotation FAMAS/ABL de certains combattants lui procure la capacité d’engager le combat à. From works as a drawing lecturer at Trinom. (drawing lectures for future architecture students). From she is a member of HDLU.
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Department of Defense Traductions: This is undoubtedly one of our major challenges for the coming years and this is also the main topic of this issue. So I may only advise you to become imbued with the different articles proposed in our magazine.
They pose the challenges, the strengths and the limitations of digitization, and try to anticipate the issues it could ge- nerate. It is our responsibility to be aware of them and firstly to meet them success- fully and in line with the evolution of our Army.
The first challenge is an organizational one: For this, we must first meet the challenge of recruitment and retention. The other challenge is that of training and directly concerns the School: The School of Infantry is already ready to carry out this increase of training flow this summer. Without compromising on the operational level, we have also launched many projects or studies to minimize the blocking effects of the specialty courses and reduce the absenteeism which is related to training courses.
The second challenge concerns our capabilities and covers two dif- ferent areas: Overall, we are on track in terms of equipment.
A multipurpose vehi- cle project, the light VBMR multi purpose armored vehicleis also appearing. At the School we strive to identify and anticipate the consequences that the new equipment will induce in school training, organization and doctrine. But the real capability challenge for the In- fantry will be the new battlespace digitization announced by both the SCORPION system and by control and battle management systems which have been designed to work in a joint environment.
This issue is trinoms technical to ensure the continuity between the mounted and dismounted trinomme. It must also be taken into account beforehand, which for us Infantrymen means that we must clearly, sufficiently and realistically formulate our digitization requirements: Finally, it is tactical. What to expect from the future collaborative war- fare? This immediacy and simultaneity of information will undoubtedly lead to profound changes.
But how to get the benefits of fast action made trinoem by information distributed immediately and by the effectiveness of a hierarchical chain, longer to deploy, but ultimately responsible?
Probably by more decentralization of decision, more autonomy given to subordinates, more coordination between neighboring levels That’s what we have to clarify without nevertheless losing sight of two key elements. combar
We must find the right balance. Moreover, digitiza- tion can only represent one actor and a half of the three key players from all conflicts. The friendly forces will be perfectly represented thanks to a Blue Force Tracking system type. The enemy will be easily represented if he comabt conventional but imperfectly if irregular or asym- metrical.
chef d’équipe trinome de combat / armurier section
As for the population and apart from its quantitative repre- sentation, it may be only briefly represented. The main thing, which is to say what is immaterial, will probably escape any digitization. So, the dismounted soldier in contact with the population over time, and therefore the infantryman first and foremost, will remain essential sen- sors of any operational situation because they are humans.
The third challenge finally, is the employability of the Infantry. However, it will still have to be versatile to adapt to changing threats. Combined arms training will remain the keystone of this versatility.
But versatility is of course multi-form: Flexi- bility to cope with the unpredictability and diversity of crises, deve- lopment of our employment capability in the national territory, development of the Dismounted Combat Support Platoons and of the Long Range Snipers Platoons, mastery of new equipment, air mobility capability, operational military assistance capability If the ambition is high, the constraints of our times are equally high and first of all combag constraint of the time available to conduct quality training.
Thus, and in conjunction with the Land Forces Command, the Infantry will have to contribute to defining its operational preparation standards. We will soon have the opportu- nity to work on it trlnome. These are according to me the main challenges and prospects for the Infantry of tomorrow.
It is our responsibility to get down to it today because they will help make the Queen of battles enter into a new era. This ambitious task aims at providing our ocmbat and combat service support units with capabilities increased by the interconnection bet- ween units and carriers, by the sharing of information down to the level of the dismounted FELIN equipped soldier, by an improved pro- tection, and by some weapons almost totally renewed future indivi- dual weapon and medium range missile.
The requirements are known: Our goal is to give our units, our infantrymen the best equipment, the best anticipation and responsiveness capabilities in order to defeat the enemy and to subject him tronome our operational tempo and to the power of our weapons.
This is the challenge of the next decade, taking advantage of the experience of our deployments and maintaining the Man, the fighter, in the centre of the battle. Better trionme, connected, protected, armed, the in- fantryman will remain the architect of victory by the combination of his equipment, his training, and by the power of his moral strength.
The Army has been resolutely committed for more than cojbat years to achieve a breakthrough in the field of military art and science through the ENC. The bayonet trinpme by Vauban gave the royal line infantry a decisive upper hand over their opponents. Napoleon could fully deploy his military genius on the battlefield thanks to his proven ability to employ the Gribeauval artillery system, far beyond the mere operation of the gun itself.
More recently, the german mo- bile operations supported by a centralised system of effective radio communications networks overwhelmed the french com- batants during the campaign. The ENC is considered by the main western armies as an indis- pensable asset to achieve tactical superiority over any enemy.
C4I systems thus like those which are deployed in our Army and successfully support the digitisation of our forces. It is now necessary to clearly define the notions which rtinome be dealt with in this issue.
The doctrine has shaped a common un- derstanding of the ENC which is simultaneously a concept, a de- cision rn process, a panel of equipment programmes and trimome technology systems, and operating skills which toge- ther contribute to operational superiority through the quick and accurate processing of informations and intelligence.
Its aim is to secure the best possible data processing thanks to improved communications, new automa- tisms, decision making processes which can only be supported by the latest technologies, especially by modern CIS systems. It was the era of the first digitised maps, of automatically produced orders, of the digitisation of C2 sys- tems. They had to be connected from top to bottom, ie from the division to the platoon, to facilitate a quick orders production, distribution and execution.
This digitisation enn significantly improved the efficiency of the ground forces through a better information sharing, a higher speed of the deci- sion making process frinome, in the end, a faster and more appro- priate commitment of first line units.
The logistic support has equally been greatly enhanced, as well as cmobat support and airs- pace management among others. This digitisation stills secures to day a clear operational advantage, since all assets are appro- priately deployed and committed at all levels. However, its implementation has been incrementally conducted to adapt to technical improvements and to CIS programmes; it remains somewhat complicated especially during the preparatory phase which are still demanding: Further- more, system interoperability issues, to exchange data flows and informations are logically colliding with security requirements which are sometimes considered as constraints.
Finally the standing evolution of the systems, which have often been designed independently, complicates their appropriation by the users and the training of specialised operators.
The School of Signals is the core of this effort and has adapted itself to meet this double challenge. It trains every year a large number of offi- cers and NCO as specialists for digitisation and digitisation sup- ported CIS.
The School of Signals will obviously support your effort and is al- ready preparing the future: New training courses are currently designed to meet combwt require- ments, especially for combat arms. Other issues are now at stake too, especially to secure a smooth transition between the current level of digitisation and the SCOR- PION one and prevent any capability ne, any operational in- terruption and any loss of competence; they will require a close coordination between all arms.
The french Infantry has committed itself deliberately in the digiti- sation process: I am confident that this issue will raise your interest and meet your curiosity. You must be certain that the Infantry, the queen of bat- tles will enjoy the utmost synergetic support of the Corps of Si- gnals, which is a teeth arm too, in the era of ENC. This open and fully-configurable system, which is common to all platforms, successfully convinced the decision-makers.
This new generation trinomd connects to a full IP bus. During the initial presentations to the armed forces, ELIPSTM was immediately perceived as a system offering new operational capabilities. By combining an innovative spirit, customer orientation, and trinom, the company was able to offer solutions per- fectly suited to operational needs in its contracts.
One of my challenges is to guarantee that our combatants have the best possible continuity of communications and information during the difficult embarking e disembarking phases in contact with the enemy.
ELNO is a recognised actor through its achievements and is an important part of this project. Trrinome, to achieve this, short cuts that had not been contemplated at first were used. Cebrowski officially appeared inits practice is much comabt. Every human group — thus including a platoon or a brigade — is trlnome definition dy network.
France modern “section de combat” (i.e french version of a platoon) w.i.p
Much of the history of combat organizations tfinome that of command and signals: While personal radios were first used by special forces, they were quickly spread to infantry: What was achieved by computing in the late s, however, changed the game.
Miniaturiza- tion has allowed what was done with vehicles to be done with men. The infantryman is muting: What he can see and hear is no longer used only by trihome comrades and his leader, but can be pushed to much higher echelons, thanks cojbat battlespace digitization, just as the action of individual soldiers can be directly controlled by their commanders.
First, that of combat kinematics: History teaches us that the area occupied by an in- fantryman has constantly increased. In Afghanistan, the million square meters has been exceeded. The subsidiary question is whether the quality of sensors makes up for the ground lost, on which the enemy can still rely.
Then, the issue of system evolution. But was the soldier still paying enough attention to his natural sensors: The technology then was not mature fu the system had been criticized, especially because it hid the first ex- pression of a soldier — cmobat face — from the population. Similarly, the type of display is an issue at the higher echelons that require contact information to operate.
It is easy to visualize a friendly or enemy position, but how could strengths and weaknesses be shown by something else other than hard- ware?
The third issue has even greater implications. With the generali- zation of radio in the armed forces — even before the First World War — we have learned that signals facilitate a more direct tacti- cal control of units, with an impact on command methods. Dk tend to become bureaucratic, with a risk of decreasing initiative at the lower levels.